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Abstract
We show that monetary exchange facilitates the transition from small to large-scale
economic interactions. In an experiment, subjects chose to play an “intertemporal
cooperation game” either in partnerships or in groups of strangers where payoffs
could be higher. Theoretically, a norm of mutual support is sufficient to maximize
efficiency through large-scale cooperation. Empirically, absent a monetary system,
participants were reluctant to interact on a large scale; and when they did, efficiency plummeted compared to partnerships because cooperation collapsed. This
failure was reversed only when a stable monetary system endogenously emerged:
the institution of money mitigated strategic uncertainty problems.

Keywords: Coordination, endogenous institutions, repeated games.
JEL codes: C70, C90, D03, E02, E40
∗

Correspondence address: Gabriele Camera, Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, One University Dr., Orange, CA 92866; e-mail: camera@chapman.edu. We thank
a co-editor and two anonymous referees for helpful comments, as well as seminar participants at GATE Lyon, Goethe University in Frankfurt, Simon Fraser University, Swedish
House of Finance, University of Basel, University of Bologna, UC Riverside, University of
Surrey, Tilburg University, the 2016 Barcelona GSE Summer Forum, the 2016 Workshop in
Behavioral Public Economics in Vienna, the 2018 Money in the Digital Age conference at
the Bank of Finland. V. Bourke and M. Luetje at the Economic Science Institute provided
outstanding research assistance. G. Camera acknowledges partial research support through
the NSF grant CCF-1101627. M. Casari acknowledges financial support through the ERC
Starting Grant number 241196.

1

1

Introduction

Large-scale cooperation is central to economic development but challenging
to achieve (North, 1991). The problem is that in large groups individuals
are strangers, and this limits the ability to reward and punish, which raises
vulnerability to exploitation and undermines trust (Milgrom et al., 1990). The
fundamental question thus is: how can we expand the scale of interaction
without undermining trust and cooperation? The literature has focused on
studying the role of enforcement and punishment institutions (Bidner and
Francois, 2011; Capra et al., 2009; Greif, 2006; Kimbrough et al., 2008). Here,
we consider a primary financial institution: money. We have designed an
experiment to uncover whether money can foster an expansion of the scale of
interaction and of cooperation.
This question is especially relevant given the exponential rise in digital
token alternatives to traditional currency instruments, such as Bitcoin and
Ethereum, which have generated renewed interest in better understanding
money and the economic problems it ultimately solves (Camera, 2017). Identifying a causal link between the development of monetary systems and economic
expansion is one of the open issues because history only provides anecdotal
evidence. The advantage of the experimental methodology is that we can suppress institutional and environmental confounding factors that characterize
field data, and understand what principles are in operation (Plott, 2001).
In our experiment, players take part in a sequence of pairwise encounters
where a good is produced at a cost below its consumption value—hence there
are gains from trade. Players face an indefinite sequence of encounters, with
roles alternating between producer and consumer (Townsend, 1980). Cooperation amounts to an intertemporal exchange of goods and is efficient, as it
2

maximizes long-term payoffs. This efficient outcome can be attained through
a norm of “mutual support.” We let players interact either as partners in fixed
pairs, or strangers in large groups where counterparts change at random. This
distinction is meaningful because large groups enjoy a return from cooperation
that is 50% greater than in partnerships—an increase which proxies for gains
from specialization and trade in wider markets. A drawback of large groups
is that strangers cannot establish a reputation.
We contrast a Control condition to a Tokens condition. While in Control consumers have nothing to offer—so producers can only provide goods
on a voluntary basis—in Tokens consumers are endowed with a symbolic
object—a token that is intrinsically worthless but storable. Here, a monetary
trade convention can spontaneously emerge if consumers can obtain a good
only in exchange for a token. By design, nobody is forced to use tokens, so
cooperation can still be sustained through a norm of mutual support. However, a monetary trade convention can also spontaneously emerge if there is a
shared belief that production will occur only in exchange for a token, in which
case tokens will be transferred back and forth among players (Camera and
Casari, 2014).
What sets this study apart from other experiments on money is that the
scale of interaction is endogenous: players choose between a partnership, or
a large group of strangers. While, in principle, a norm of mutual support
could promote the formation of large cooperative groups in either condition,
the data suggest that the availability of a monetary system played a key role:
in fact, forming a large group when a monetary system was unavailable led to
efficiency losses. This suggests that a causal link exists between the development of a monetary system and the choice to form large groups. There is also
a positive association between group expansion, strength of monetary system,
3

and economic gains.
At the heart of these results lies a tension between higher but riskier payoffs in large groups, and smaller but safer payoffs in partnerships. Though the
use of tokens is not required for the creation of large cooperative groups, it facilitates the expansion of the scale of interaction because it mitigates strategic
uncertainty problems and reduces the gains from free riding. Strategic uncertainty emerges because the game supports multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria,
and this impairs coordination on efficient play (Blonski et al., 2011; Capra et
al., 2009; Van Huyck et al., 1990). Adopting a monetary trade convention mitigates this problem because it limits the exposure to potential losses compared
to a norm of mutual support. Moreover, such a norm requires a great deal of
confidence that others will not succumb to opportunistic temptations as the
game progresses—receiving help without giving any. This kind of confidence
is not easily established in large groups, because interaction is impersonal and
reciprocity impossible (Fehr and Gächter, 2000; Gächter and Hermann, 2011).
Relying on monetary exchange helps building confidence because it imposes
significant losses on those who adopt exploitative strategies.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides some context by discussing the related experimental literature. Section 3 describes the design.
Section 4 presents the theory. Section 5 reports the main results and Section
6 offers some final considerations.

2

Related experiments

This study is at the intersection of two strands of experimental literature: cooperation in large and small groups, and the study of money (Table 1). The
typical finding when group size is exogenously manipulated, is that coopera4

tion falls as groups get larger (see papers in Table 1, top-left cell). By contrast,
experiments that endogenously vary the group size report a positive effect on
cooperation (Table 1, top-right cell). This may be driven by self-selection, as
participants can form homogeneous groups of cooperators thanks to mechanisms such as “voting with your feet” or ostracism.1 Our approach sidesteps
this shortcoming by studying endogenous group formation without the possibility of self-selection. In our design, subjects choose the group size and then
are randomly allocated to groups. This enables us to study how the institutional environment affects subjects’ ability to support large-scale cooperation
when interactions cannot be restricted to homogenous groups of cooperators.
Table 1: A map of related experimental literature
Exogenous group size

Endogenous group size

No monetary
institution

Camera et al. (2013a)
Carpenter (2007)
Diederich et al. (2016)
Huck et al. (2004)
Isaac and Walker (1988)
Nosenzo et al. (2015), etc.

Ahn et al. (2009)
Güth et al. (2007)
Maier-Rigaud et. al. (2010)
Nash et al. (2012)
This study
(Control condition)

With monetary
institution

Camera et al. (2013a)
Duffy and Puzzello (2014)

This study
(Tokens condition)

Our paper also contributes to the growing experimental literature on money
as a means of payment, which started with the early contributions of McCabe
(1989), Lian and Plott (1998), and Marimon and Sunder (1993). Within this
line of research, ours is the first study that addresses the fundamental question
of endogenizing the group size. In previous experiments with money, either the
1

In these experiments, the choice of group size is intertwined with the choice of group
composition, although these are separate issues: one could keep the group size constant,
while endogenously altering group composition.
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group size is fixed (Camera and Casari, 2014) or it is exogenously manipulated
(Camera et al., 2013a; Duffy and Puzzello, 2014). Results form these earlier
studies suggest that monetary systems are especially useful in large groups,
although the evidence is not conclusive.2 The original design that we adopt
allows us to measure whether the institution of money promotes cooperation
on a larger and more efficient scale, when self-selection is impossible.
This paper is part of a broader research agenda about the behavioral importance of monetary systems. In particular, it builds on three earlier works
where the group size is exogenously imposed, and the returns from cooperation
are independent of group size (Bigoni et al., 2015; Camera and Casari, 2014;
Camera et al., 2013a). The present study contains two elements of novelty:
the returns from cooperation increase in the scale of interaction, and the group
size is determined by a collective choice. This allows us to explore the relation
between the emergence of a monetary system, the expansion of markets and
economic development, with a political economy angle.
Here, we lay out the distinct objectives and design of these three closely
related works, and the additional insights of the present study. Camera and
Casari (2014) proves that fiat money can endogenously emerge in the lab;
it also shows that money has functions that go beyond pushing forward the
efficiency frontier. This is done by adopting a design where—unlike the present
study—monetary trade is theoretically inefficient. Results indicate that fiat
monetary exchange emerges nonetheless, and it facilitates a coordination on
cooperative play that is hardly attained without money.
2

Camera et al. (2013a) report that when monetary trade is unavailable cooperation rates decline with the size of the group, but remain constant if participants can engage in monetary
trade. Duffy and Puzzello (2014) report that the presence of money enables coordination
on a more efficient equilibrium, but a replication of this result has failed (see Camerer et
al., 2016).

6

The article in Camera et al. (2013a) studies cooperation under exogenous
variation of group size, from two to thirty-two players, with and without tokens. The paper finds that without tokens cooperation falls as groups get
larger, while with tokens it remains stable. Unlike the present study, subjects
experienced just one group size before being forced into a large group, so they
could not assess how size affects cooperation. Another fundamental difference
with the present study is that subjects neither had the option to expand the
group size, nor the incentives to do so because the returns from cooperation
could not increase as groups got larger. Here, instead, the transition from
partnerships to large groups is endogenous and is also theoretically socially
efficient. This allows us to study how the emergence of a monetary system
affects the scale of interaction as well as realized efficiency. The theoretical
advantage of a monetary strategy over a grim strategy is that it facilitates
cooperation in large groups by reducing strategic uncertainty. The empirical
results support this theoretical intuition.
Bigoni et al. (2015) investigates a mechanism that—according to current
thinking in monetary theory (Kocherlakota, 1998; Ostroy, 1973)—could possibly explain these earlier results: do tokens act just as carriers of information
about past conduct? The design thus introduces a treatment characterized
by a reputational mechanism which, theoretically, should prove superior to a
monetary system in supporting efficient play. In fact, the experiment does not
provide support for this view because cooperation rates are substantially lower
with a reputation mechanism than with tokens, suggesting that money is not
just a carrier of information about past conduct.

7
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Experimental design

The experiment has two conditions. We first fully explain the Control condition, and then discuss the changes introduced in the Tokens condition.
Control condition. In the Control condition, participants play a “helping game” in pairs composed of a producer and a consumer. Each producer
starts with 6 consumption units (CUs) and can choose to help (“give help”) or
not (“no help”). The consumer has 3 CUs. Helping yields a payoff of 0 CUs
to the producer and a payoff of k > 9 CUs to the consumer; the net benefit
from help is k − 9 CUs. The value of the parameter k depends on the size of
the economy, as explained below.
Participants play this game repeatedly, in “cycles” of uncertain duration.
A cycle consists of at least sixteen rounds, after which we implement a continuation probability of 75%.3 Hence, cycle duration is the same for everyone in
the same cycle of a session, although it can vary across cycles and sessions. In
each round, half of the participants are consumers and half producers. Roles
are randomly assigned in the first round, and deterministically alternate in the
following rounds. CUs cumulate across rounds, and are converted into dollars
at the end of the session. This set-up captures the essence of an interaction,
in which there are gains from intertemporal trade.
A session includes six cycles. In each cycle, participants interact either
3

A cycle lasted an average of 19 rounds, the longest session lasted 127 rounds. The length
of the cycle was not pre-selected in advance. We introduce a discontinuity in continuation
probability in round 16 for two reasons. First, it provides each subject with a minimum
degree of experience, and minimizes the confounding effect of heterogeneous duration across
cycles and treatments, while keeping cycles’ duration ex-ante unknown to participants and
experimenters alike. Second, it allows us to implement a perfect stranger matching across
cycles, which is key to avoid reputation spillover effects and to maintain a close connection
with the theory. Experimental results appear robust to changing the number of initial fixed
rounds (Camera et al., 2013b).
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in partnerships or large groups of 12 or 24 individuals. In a partnership, the
counterpart is fixed throughout a cycle. In large groups, the counterpart is
randomly chosen in every round, and identities remain undisclosed; hence,
individuals interact as strangers. There is anonymous public monitoring: at
the end of each round, participants can see whether or not the outcome was
identical in every pair of their group (“yes” or “no”). Participants can view a
record of this feedback—as well as own payoffs, roles, actions and outcomes—
for all past rounds of the cycle. Public monitoring makes small and large
groups more comparable because it ensures that the crucial parameter that
theoretically supports full cooperation is independent of group size (see Section
4). To minimize reputational spillovers, no information is made available about
outcomes outside the participant’s group. We also adopt a perfect stranger
matching procedure across cycles, ensuring that no one interacts with someone
met in previous cycles (except possibly in cycle 6).4
Benefits from cooperation are greater in large groups (k = 18) than in
partnerships (k = 15); see Table 2.
Table 2: Payoffs in partnerships and large groups
Producer

Consumer

No help

Give help

3, 6

15, 0

Producer

Consumer

(a) Partnerships

No help

Give help

3, 6

18, 0

(b) Large groups

If no one cooperates, then average per-capita payoffs are 4.5 CUs both in
partnerships and large groups. Instead, under full cooperation they reach 7.5
CUs in partnerships, and 9 CUs in large groups. Hence, by design, the return
4

This is feasible because of deterministic alternation of roles. For details about matching
across cycles see the online Appendix.
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from cooperation is 50% greater in large groups compared to partnerships: full
cooperation creates a per-capita surplus of 3 CUs in partnerships and 4.5 CUs
in large groups, relative to 4.5 CUs when no one cooperates.5
However, expanding the scale of interaction is not necessarily beneficial, because surplus creation depends on the cooperation rate achieved in the group.
We assess a group’s success in creating surplus by measuring economic efficiency, which is the proportion of surplus created by the group in the average
round of play, relative to the maximum potential of 4.5 CUs. Efficiency is
directly proportional to the cooperation rate in the group. It is invariably zero
when no one cooperates, while if everyone cooperates it reaches 67% (3 out of
4.5 CUs) in partnerships and 100% (4.5 out of 4.5 CUs) in large groups.
Each session consists of a Training Phase (cycles 1-4) and a Selection Phase
(cycles 5-6). Training Phase interaction exogenously alternates across cycles
between partnerships and groups of 12. To control for order effects, group
size in the Training Phase followed either the order 2-12-2-12 or 12-2-12-2 (4
sessions per order, per treatment). Instead, the scale of interaction in the
Selection Phase is endogenous. Before the start of cycles 2-5, participants
express a preference for partnerships or groups of 12; before cycle 6, they
choose partnerships or a group of 24. The majority of choices determines the
group size for everyone in the session: the choices made before cycles 2-5 were
all counted to select the group size for cycle 5, while the group size for cycle 6
was determined only by the choices made before that cycle.6
5

While the assumption that large markets have higher returns than small markets is uncontroversial, the specific wealth multipliers of 1.67 and 2 employed in the experiment are
discretionary, although well within the range in the experimental literature. Public good
experiments typically use multipliers between 1.2 and 2.5, trust games generally ranging
between 3 and 6. As in any experiment, the quantitative results are of course tied to the
exact parameter values.
6
The design exhibits an asymmetry in the number of choices expressed for groups of size 2
vs. 12 as compared to 2 vs. 24. Alternative designs could eliminate this asymmetry but
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Tokens condition. In this condition we add symbolic, intrinsically worthless objects, or “tokens,” which cannot be redeemed for CUs or dollars, and
have no reference to outside currencies. This expands the strategy space, by
introducing the possibility of trading help through a direct mechanism (see
Table 3).
Table 3: The stage game in the Tokens condition
Producer

Consumer

No help

Give help

Sell help

Do nothing

3, 6

k, 0

3, 6

Transfer a token

3, 6

k, 0

Buy help

3, 6

k, 0

~→

~→

~→

~→

k, 0
~→

k, 0

Notes: In the experiment k = 15 in partnerships and k = 18 in large groups, and actions
had neutral labels. “~ →” indicates the transfer of a token from consumer to producer.

The supply of tokens is fixed: in round one, every consumer has one token
and producers have none. This introduces the possibility of fiat monetary
exchange. The consumer has three alternative actions: carry over the token
to the next round (“Do nothing”); unilaterally “transfer a token”; or “buy
help” in exchange for a token. The producer can “give help” or not—as in
the Control condition—but can also “sell help” in exchange for a token.
present other drawbacks. For instance, subjects could have made just one choice before
cycle 5 (12 vs. 2) and one before cycle 6 (24 vs. 2), and no choices in previous cycles.
Relative to our design, which induces subjects to think more thoroughly about the choice
over group size, this alternative reduces the focus on the importance of the choice of group
size. Another alternative is to elicit two choices before each cycle 2-4 (one for 12 vs. 2, the
other for 24 vs. 2), and then to elicit a single choice before cycle 5 and before cycle 6. We
believe this alternative lowers subjects’ understanding of the task, relative to our design,
and is more likely to generate noisy choices.
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Choices are made simultaneously and without communication. Actions had
neutral labels: terms like “buy” and “sell” were never used in the instructions
(for details see online Appendix).
The two possible payoff configuration are the same as in the Control
condition. The payoffs are 0 CUs for the producer, and k CUs for the consumer,
when the producer helps unconditionally or help is exchanged for a token.
Otherwise the payoffs are 6 CUs for the producer, and 3 CUs for the consumer.
At the end of each round, a participant observes the outcome in the pair –
whether help was given, whether a token was transferred – but not the action
of the counterpart. Consider that there are multiple combinations of actions
that lead to help jointly with the transfer of a token (Table 3).
If a consumer has no tokens, he has no actions to take, and the producer
can only choose whether to help unconditionally or not: hence the decision
situation is identical to the Control condition. Token holdings are partially
observable by the counterpart: in every pair, each player can see if the counterpart has either 0 or at least one token; the exact number is unobservable in
order to preserve anonymity and to reduce the cognitive load.
Experimental procedures. The experiment involved 384 undergraduate
volunteers, each of whom participated in only one session between 9/2014
and 10/2014. We ran 8 sessions for the Control and 8 for the Tokens
condition, with 24 participants each. The conversion rate was 1CUs=US$0.20.
Sessions lasted about 2 hours (including instructions, quiz and payments) and
participants were paid on average US$26.73 in cash, privately, at the end of
the session. Only one randomly selected cycle from the session was paid.
The experiment was programmed using the software z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007) and ran in the Economic Science Institute’s laboratory at Chapman
12

University. No eye contact was possible. We collected participants’ demographic data through an end-of-session anonymous survey. The experimenter
read the instructions and participants followed on individual copies. The instructions adopted a neutral language: the words “help,” “cooperation,” and
“money” were never used (see online Appendix). Before the Training Phase,
participants took a quiz with ten questions testing their understanding of the
instructions, and received 25 cents for each correct answer.
Design choices and possible alternatives. Here we provide a few additional considerations about the specific design adopted in this experiment,
based on results from complementary studies within this line of research.
A first consideration is about the choice of information structure. One
may argue that the Tokens condition adds information about individual past
conduct that is unavailable in Control; treatment effects may thus be driven
by the richer information structure and not by the possibility of monetary
exchange. This important issue is the focus of a companion study (Bigoni et
al., 2015). There, a third experimental condition introduces a public record
of past individual actions which, theoretically, should supersede the function
performed by tokens. The data reveal that cooperation rates in this condition
are substantially lower than in Tokens, providing evidence that monetary
systems perform a richer set of functions than just revealing past behaviors.
A similar result also emerges in Camera and Casari (forth.), which shows that
information about past conduct alone is ineffective in overcoming cooperation
challenges in indefinitely repeated games among strangers.
A second consideration concerns the action space in Tokens. One may
be concerned that the three alternatives available to the subjects in this design may bias the subjects’ behavior in favor of the emergence of monetary
13

exchange. Bigoni et al. (2015) addresses this possible concern, with a design
including additional actions that are antithetical to monetary exchange. The
consumer can give a token only if the producer does not help, while the producer can commit to help only if he does not receive a token. Hence, tokens
may take on a negative connotation as subjects could use them to tag defectors. Even under this expanded action set, we observe that subjects learn to
use tokens as a medium of exchange, neglecting these additional actions.
A third consideration relates to subjects’ experience with monetary systems in their daily lives. One may surmise that subjects accustomed to deal
with money outside the lab automatically coordinate on using tokens as media
of exchange in the experiment. Evidence from earlier studies on the endogenous emergence of monetary systems does not support this view. In fact, the
experimental data reveal that subjects need to have repeated exposure to the
Tokens condition in order to discover how tokens can function as money, so
that it takes time for a widespread monetary convention to emerge (Bigoni et
al., 2015; Camera and Casari, 2014; Camera et al., 2013a). The four cycles of
Training Phase in this design are meant to facilitate this process.

4

Theoretical considerations

Why should players form large groups? By design, cooperating in large groups
is more rewarding than in partnerships, so full cooperation in large groups is
Pareto-efficient. In this section we demonstrate that, according to standard
theory, full cooperation is an equilibrium in the Control condition both in
partnerships and in large groups (Section 4.1). This suggest there is no reason to expect higher cooperation rates in partnerships than in large groups. In
fact, large groups theoretically support full cooperation for lower discount fac14

tors than partnerships due to the higher returns from cooperation and public
monitoring. Evidence from previous experiments on repeated games among
partners suggests that lower threshold discount factors facilitate cooperation
(Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2011). Therefore, if Pareto dominance is a relevant
equilibrium selection criterion, subjects should choose large groups over partnerships. These considerations suggest a first testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Players in the Control condition will select large groups
over partnerships.
We proceed by showing that a fully cooperative equilibrium exists also in
the Tokens condition (Section 4.2). This equilibrium can be equivalently
sustained with and without using tokens as money. In particular, using tokens
as money does not alter the return from cooperation relative to the Control condition, neither in partnerships nor in large groups. These additional
considerations suggest a second testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. The availability of tokens will not alter the selection of the
scale of interaction.
Finally, since each condition supports multiple equilibria, we go beyond the
canonical theoretical analysis by studying the impact of strategic uncertainty
(Section 4.3). We demonstrate that in the Control condition strategic uncertainty may prevent coordination on the efficient equilibrium, but that the
use of tokens as money can resolve this problem. Based on this refinement
to standard theory, we surmise that if strategic uncertainty motivates choices,
then the use of money might tilt the selection of interaction scale toward large
groups, in contrast to the hypothesis stated above.

15

4.1

Control condition

Here we show that in our experiment full cooperation can be supported as a
sequential Nash equilibrium in groups of any size. To do so, we consider a
“grim” trigger strategy specifying actions—for a player who is a producer—
based on two “states”: (i) Cooperation: the player selects “give help”; (ii)
Punishment: the player selects “no help.” The strategy specifies that the player
starts in the cooperation state and permanently transitions to the punishment
state if anyone in the group defects (including the player himself). If this
strategy is commonly adopted, then it is called a social norm. This social norm
can support full cooperation in groups of any size thanks to the availability of
anonymous public monitoring (Kandori, 1992, Proposition 1). The strategy
is constructed so that after any history of play, conduct in the continuation
game is part of an equilibrium of the original game (Abreu et al., 1990). The
central feature of this norm is that the entire group participates in punishing
defections so in equilibrium no one defects. We have the following:
6
, then full cooperation is part of a sek−3
quential Nash equilibrium, where β ∗ = 0.4 in large groups and β ∗ = 0.5 in
Proposition 1. If β ≥ β ∗ :=

partnerships.
Proof. See the Appendix A.
If participants are risk-neutral, then the fully cooperative equilibrium exists
in the Control condition, in groups of any size, because in the experiment
β = 0.75. The threshold β ∗ depends only on the differences in returns from
cooperation and not on the group size because of public monitoring. Moreover,
the derivation of this threshold fully takes into account the discontinuity in
continuation probability that characterizes our design.
16

The result in Proposition 1 is based on the assumption that all players coordinate on a punishment strategy that is immediate, indiscriminate and unforgiving. However, previous experimental results show that trigger strategies
of this kind are uncommon among partners and even more so among strangers
(Camera et al., 2012; Dal Bó and Fréchette, 2011; Fudenberg et al., 2012).
Furthermore, the condition β ≥ β ∗ does not guarantee that full cooperation
will be realized because many equilibria exist in the game. For these reasons,
below we will refine this standard theoretical prediction by incorporating the
concept of risk-dominance into the analysis (Section 4.3).

4.2

Tokens condition

All the equilibria that exist in the Control condition also exist in the Tokens condition, because tokens are intrinsically worthless, do not restrict action sets, and can be ignored. In addition, cooperation can be supported as
an equilibrium by means of monetary trade.
Definition 1 (Monetary trade strategy). In any round t, after any history,
if the player has no tokens, she has no action to take as a consumer and chooses
“sell help” as a producer. If the player has some tokens, she chooses “buy help”
as a consumer and selects “no help” as a producer.
We call monetary trade the outcome that results when everyone adopts the
strategy in Definition 1. Here, help is only given quid-pro-quo in exchange
for one token.7 Otherwise, help is not given. In monetary equilibrium all
encounters support trade due to the deterministic alternation between roles,
7

Transferring more than one token is unnecessary to attain full cooperation, and is also
impossible in monetary equilibrium because each consumer has just one token. These
considerations, and a desire to minimize the cognitive load for participants, explain why
in our design consumers could transfer only one token per round.
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so equilibrium payoffs are identical to those attained under the social norm. It
follows that if the social norm of cooperation is an equilibrium, then monetary
trade is also an equilibrium.
6
, then the monetary trade strategy in
k−3
Definition 1 supports full cooperation in equilibrium.
Proposition 2. If β ≥ β ∗ =

Proof. See Appendix A.
To sum up, adding tokens neither precludes the adoption of the social
norm of cooperation, nor forces the use of tokens. If the discount factor β
supports the fully cooperative equilibrium without using tokens, then this
is also sufficient to support full cooperation by exchanging tokens. Adding
tokens simply expands the strategy set, but it neither eliminates equilibria,
nor expands the set of payoffs compared to the Control condition.

4.3

Strategic uncertainty: the role of tokens

Previous experimental results suggest that tokens positively influence outcomes: Camera and Casari (2014) report that tokens facilitated coordination
on cooperative play in stable groups of four players; Camera et al. (2013a)
report that when the group size was exogenously increased, cooperation rates
declined without tokens, but this no longer occurred when subjects could exchange tokens. What is the theoretical mechanism behind these results? In
this section we show that the use of tokens reduces the strategic uncertainty
that exists in large groups. As a consequence, the use of tokens may promote
the choice of large groups over partnerships.
To study how strategic uncertainty affects the ability to support the efficient outcome, we take two steps. First, we demonstrate that in the Control
18

condition strategic uncertainty may prevent coordination on the efficient equilibrium in large groups (but not in partnerships). Then, we show that the
use of tokens as money can resolve this problem. The theoretical argument is
built along the lines of the study in Blonski et al. (2011), which adapts the
static concept of risk-dominance to an infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma
in fixed pairs. We study risk dominance for the grim strategy and for the
monetary trade strategy, by considering each strategy in isolation against the
alternative strategy “always defect.” Our focus on comparing two equilibria,
instead of three or more, reflects the standard approach in the literature. In
doing so, we assume that a player who is unsure about the strategy choice of
others adopts the “principle of insufficient reason,” placing equal weight on
each strategy choice.
The main result can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 3. The monetary strategy is risk dominant in large groups, while
the grim strategy is not.
Proof. See Appendix A
Start by noting that, without tokens, strategic uncertainty is not a problem
in partnerships because there is just one player (the producer) who takes an
action in each round. In round 1, the action of the producer fully reveals
her strategy, “grim” or “always defect.” Therefore, the counterpart faces no
strategic uncertainty when she becomes a producer in round 2. The initial
producer can thus select the efficient equilibrium by cooperating. This is the
central difference between our helping game in fixed pairs and the prisoner’s
dilemma studied in Blonski et al. (2011).
Now consider large groups without tokens. Here there is strategic uncertainty because many producers simultaneously choose between “grim” and
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“always defect” in round 1. Grim is risk dominant if initial producers are
at least indifferent to choosing the competing strategy. The payoff expected
from choosing grim depends only on the likelihood that full cooperation is the
outcome in round 1, by the end of which all strategic uncertainty is resolved:
given public monitoring, if there is full cooperation, then this will also be the
outcome in every future round, otherwise there will be full defection forever
after. Consider an initial producer who chooses the grim strategy. Suppose
she believes that every other initial producer selects grim with probability
0 < p < 1. If there are n − 1 other producers, then the probability of full cooperation in round 1 is pn−1 , which is decreasing in n. It follows that, for any
p, risk-dominance as a strategy selection criterion requires a greater threshold
discount factor β ∗∗ to support cooperation, as compared to the threshold β ∗
implied by standard theoretical arguments. In particular, if we assume that
p = 0.5 as per the principle of insufficient reason, then β ∗∗ ' 0.98 for groups
of 12, and β ∗∗ ' 0.99 for groups of 24. As a consequence, the grim strategy is
not risk dominant in large groups in our design. The message is that strategic
uncertainty is likely to impair coordination on the efficient equilibrium in the
Control condition.
Monetary trade can resolve this problem because it is risk dominant in large
groups. In the Tokens condition, let the choice be between “monetary trade”
and “always defect” in round 1. Initial consumers have always an incentive to
select monetary trade since tokens do not bestow benefits per se. So consider
initial producers. As before, suppose an initial producer believes that every
other initial producer selects monetary trade with probability 0 < p < 1. If
p = 0.5, then β ∗∗ ' 0.63 for groups of 12, and β ∗∗ ' 0.64 for groups of 24. The
reason why the threshold discount factor β ∗∗ needed to support cooperation is
not as high as without tokens is that miscoordination on monetary trade does
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not trigger the permanent and indiscriminate form of punishment associated
with grim. Hence, though strategy miscoordination does reduce payoffs of
monetary traders, adopting the monetary trade strategy can be profitable
even if not everyone else does the same.
These considerations suggest that the addition of tokens can be very helpful
to widen the scale of cooperation, improving payoffs. This, of course, may
occur only if tokens are used as money in the experiment. In that case, the
emergence of a monetary system might induce subjects to choose large groups
over partnerships in the Tokens condition. This contrasts with Hypothesis
2, which is based on standard theoretical arguments that do not account for
the role of strategic uncertainty.

5

Results

We report four main results, which are based on subjects’ behavior in the Selection Phase (cycles 5 and 6). Before presenting them, we provide an overview
of behavior in the Training Phase. To balance the number of observations
across cycles and session, the analysis focuses on rounds 1-16 of a cycle. The
four results reported are robust to considering all rounds.

5.1

Training Phase

Average cooperation rates were higher in partnerships than in large groups
(69.4% vs. 50.0%, p-value = 0.016 in Control; 67.6% vs. 48.8%, p-value
= 0.023 in Tokens; see also the regression in Table 4, Model 1).8 However,
in the Training Phase, partnerships did not create more surplus than large
8

p-values presented in this paragraph are based on two-sided Wilcoxon matched-pairs signedrank tests with exact statistics, taking two (matched) observations per session: N1 =N2 =8.
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groups because, by design, they had lower returns from cooperation (efficiency
was 46.2% vs. 50.0% in Control, and 46.1% vs. 48.8% in Tokens; p-value
> 0.1 under both conditions, see also Table 4). Given this evidence, there is
no clear social benefit from enlarging the scale of interaction, and hence no
reason to expect that a majority of participants would express a preference for
large groups in either condition.
Table 4: How money and group size influence efficiency.

Control × large
Tokens × partnership
Tokens × large
Cycle 2
Cycle 3
Cycle 4
Constant
N
R-squared

Model 1
Dep. var. = Cooperation
coefficient
S.E
-0.194***
(0.040)
-0.018
(0.040)
-0.206***
(0.040)
0.180***
(0.040)
0.212***
(0.040)
0.275***
(0.040)
0.527***
(0.037)
64
0.633

Model 2
Dep. var. = Efficiency
coefficient
S.E
0.037
(0.035)
-0.012
(0.035)
0.025
(0.035)
0.155***
(0.035)
0.167***
(0.035)
0.230***
(0.035)
0.325***
(0.033)
64
0.463

Notes: One observation is the per-round average cooperation or efficiency in each
cycle of a session. Training Phase only (cycles 1-4). The default condition is Control and partnerships. Linear regressions on a set of regressors that include the
interaction between the Condition and group size. Data from rounds 1-16 only.
Except for constant, all regressors are dummy variables. The difference between
coefficients for Tokens × partnership and Tokens × large is statistically significant
in Model 1 (two-sided Wald test, p-value<0.001), but not in Model 2 (two-sided
Wald test, p-value =0.289). The difference between coefficients for Tokens × large
and Control × large is statistically insignificant in Model 1 (two-sided Wald test, pvalue=0.770), and in Model 2 (two-sided Wald test, p-value =0.739). The difference
between coefficients for Cycle 2 and Cycle 4 is statistically significant in Models 1
and 2 (two-sided Wald test, p-values=0.020 and 0.037, respectively). Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗,
∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

A second important consideration is that a monetary trade convention
emerged in the experiment, but its development required some time and experience. In the Training Phase, holding group size constant, aggregate coopera22

tion rates and efficiency were similar in Control and Tokens; this evidence
is provided by the first three coefficients in the regressions in Table 4.9 However, there were important differences in individual actions across Conditions.
In Tokens, whenever monetary trade was feasible (i.e. the consumer had
at least one token), consumers overwhelmingly chose “buy help” (81.8%) and
producers mostly chose “sell help” (63.4%). Instead, help was rarely given
to consumers without tokens (18.3%); this contrasts with behavior observed
under the same decisional situation in Control, where “give help” was the
predominant choice (59.7%). Simply put, in Tokens producers were reluctant to help without being concurrently compensated with a token. These
results are in line with previous experiments (Bigoni et al., 2015; Camera et
al., 2013a), thus providing a reassuring replication of earlier results obtained
under different experimental protocols, payoffs, and continuation probability
(Camerer et al., 2016).
In what follows, we report how these differences in Training Phase behavior across conditions influenced participants’ desire to widen the scale of
interaction in the Selection Phase.

5.2

The choice of scale of interaction

The experimental evidence does not support either of the theoretical hypotheses about the endogenous scale of interaction, while it is in line with the
competing, behavioral hypotheses.
Result 1. Without tokens, participants infrequently form large groups.
Result 2. The availability of tokens promotes the formation of large groups.
9

In addition, for each group size we obtain a p-value > 0.1 for both cooperation rate and
efficiency, based on two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney ranksum tests with exact statistics,
taking one observation per session with N1 = N2 = 8.
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Participants in Tokens selected to interact in large groups more frequently
than in Control (Table 5).
Table 5: Share of preferences for large groups.
Overall (cycles 2-6)
Selection Phase only
—Cycle 5 (groups of 12)
Large groups formed in
—Cycle 6 (groups of 24)
Large groups formed in

Control
0.421

Tokens
0.546

0.432
2 of 8 sessions
0.354
1 of 8 sessions

0.573
6 of 8 sessions
0.542
4 of 8 sessions

By the end of the Training Phase, all subjects have experienced two cycles
of interactions in two different partnerships and in two different groups of 12.
Therefore, to analyze preferences for large and small groups, we focus on the
choices expressed in the Selection Phase, comprising cycles 5 and 6. Overall,
the share of preferences for large groups is 55.8% in Tokens and 39.3% in
Control; the difference is statistically significant according to a two-sided
Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test (p-value = 0.030, N1 = N2 = 8) and to the
regression in Table 6 (p-value 0.014 on “Tokens condition” coefficient).

24

Table 6: How money affects preferences for large groups.
Dependent variable:
preference for large groups (yes=1)
Tokens condition (dummy)
Cycle 6 (dummy)
Controls
N

marg. eff.
0.177**
-0.055
Yes
768

S.E
(0.072)
(0.034)

Notes: One observation per person per cycle. Data for Selection Phase only (cycles
5 and 6). Panel probit regression on the preferences for large groups, with standard
errors robust for clustering at the session level. The regression includes controls for
order effects in the Training Phase, sex, and for the number of right answers and the
response time in a comprehension test on the experimental instructions. Marginal
effects are computed at the mean of the value of regressors (at zero for dummy
variables). Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively.

The result is robust to separately considering cycle 5 and cycle 6 according
to two regressions based on the same specification as the regression in Table 6
(the coefficients on the Tokens dummy are significant at the 5 percent level, in
both cycle 5 and 6). However, according to two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney
tests run separately for cycle 5 and 6, the treatment effect is significant only
for cycle 6 (p-values = 0.109 and 0.065, respectively, for cycle 5 and cycle 6).
Next we analyze the choice of group size and investigate the determinants
of these choices. Is it monetary exchange that induced a preference for large
groups, or the experience of higher cooperation levels? We can exclude differences in cooperation rates as the main explanation: as noted above, in
the Training phase cooperation levels were not statistically different between
Tokens and Control. Therefore it must be the exposure to monetary exchange itself that induced different choices over group size. In what follows we
investigate how.
Two elements of the experience during the Training Phase determined an
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individual’s disposition to widen the scale of interaction: experiences of full
cooperation (the subject always receives help as a consumer, and always gives
help as a producer) and exploitation by free-riders (the subject gives more help
than he receives). Below we quantify these two elements, and we explain how
they affect the individual’s choice of group size in the Selection Phase.
We measure exploitation in the Training Phase by the endogenous variable
help imbalance, calculated as the difference between how frequently a participant received and gave help in a cycle, normalized for the number of rounds.
Figure 1 shows that help imbalance goes from -1 to 1: it is negative for someone who gave help more frequently than she received it, positive otherwise.
In particular, help imbalance takes value -1 for an unconditional cooperator
who always gave help as producer, but never received help as consumer; this
corresponds to an average payoff of 1.5 CUs per round. Conversely, a freerider who never helped as producer, but always received help as consumer,
has an imbalance of 1; this corresponds to an average payoff of 3+k/2 CUs
per round. The help imbalance is 0 for someone who gave and received help
in equal amounts, over the course of a cycle; this occurs when the participant
experienced full cooperation (denoted by the dark bars in Figure 1), partial
but proportionate cooperation (e.g., the participant helped three out of eight
times as a producer, and received help three out of eight times as a consumer),
or no cooperation at all. As a result, the average payoff associated with 0 help
imbalance ranges between 1.5+k/2 (full cooperation) and 4.5 (no cooperation)
CUs per round.
Participants are unsure which strategy others will use. This strategic uncertainty (Heinemann et al., 2009; Van Huyck et al., 1990) implies that those who
help in order to establish a cooperative norm may not receive help in future
rounds. This exploitation hazard is captured by the dispersion of help imbal26

Figure 1: The distribution of help imbalance.
Notes: Help imbalance is the difference between how frequently a participant gave
and received help in a cycle, normalized for the number of rounds. Unconditional cooperators who always gave help as producers, and never received help as consumers,
have an imbalance of -1; conversely, free-riders who never helped as producers, and
always received help as consumers, have an imbalance of 1. An imbalance of 0 indicates the a participant gave and received help in equal amounts. Data from rounds
1-16, Training Phase only; four observations per participant.

ance across participants; Figure 1 reveals that it was greater in large groups
than partnerships. A zero imbalance was more frequently attained in partnerships than large groups: in Control we have 0.563 vs. 0.156, respectively;
in Tokens we have 0.609 vs. 0.299 (p-value = 0.008 in each treatment—
two-sided Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests with exact statistics, two
matched observations per session: N1 =N2 =8); additional evidence is provided
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by the “Large groups” coefficient in Table B1, in the online Appendix.
A widespread adoption of monetary exchange offers protection against exploitation hazards because a participant must transfer a token to receive help,
and the only way to obtain tokens is to help others. There is evidence that
the possibility to trade tokens for help quid-pro-quo reduced this exploitation
hazard in the experiment. We more frequently observe zero help imbalance
in Tokens than in Control, especially in large groups where it was almost
twice as frequent (0.299 vs. 0.156, p-value = 0.0026—two-sided WilcoxonMann Whitney ranksum test with exact statistics, one observation per session:
N1 =N2 =8); Table B2 in the online Appendix provides further evidence.
Were the more cooperative type of participants more likely to choose a
large group? The probit regression in Table 7 estimates how the desire to
widen the scale of interaction is affected by various factors in the Selection
Phase, when participants had already experienced small and large groups. The
dependent variable takes value 1 when a participant expressed a preference for
large groups of 12 and 24 (cycles 5 and 6, respectively) and zero otherwise.
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Table 7: Money promotes the formation of large groups.
Dependent variable: Individual preference
for large groups (0=partnerships)
Tokens condition x cycle 5 (dummy)
Tokens condition x cycle 6 (dummy)
Cycle 6 (dummy)
Training phase
Help imbalance - partnerships
Help imbalance - large groups
Full cooperation - partnerships (dummy)
Controls
N

marg. eff.
0.115
0.156*
-0.087*

S.E
(0.075)
(0.080)
(0.052)

0.135
0.312***
-0.183***
Yes
768

(0.146)
(0.072)
(0.062)

Notes: One observation per person per cycle. Panel probit regressions on preferences for large groups of 12 and 24 expressed in the Selection Phase (cycles 5 and
6, respectively), with standard errors robust for clustering at the session level. The
regression includes controls for order effects in the Training Phase, sex, the number of right answers and response time in a comprehension test on the instructions.
Marginal effects are computed at the regressors’ mean value (at zero for dummy variables). Data from rounds 1-16 only. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

This regression reveals that free riders, i.e. those who received more help
than they gave, were more willing to interact in large groups. Instead, those
exploited by free riders were more likely to opt for the safety experienced in
partnerships. This may seem surprising but consider, first, that participants
could not self-select into homogenous groups of cooperators, and, second, that
in large groups free riders could not be directly targeted for punishment.
Support for these findings comes from the estimated coefficients on help
imbalance experienced during the Training Phase in partnerships and groups
of strangers, and full cooperation in partnerships. The regression reveals that
help imbalance in large groups is crucial. The share of free riders was similar
across conditions (37.0% vs. 37.2%, Figure 1), but more participants were
exploited in Control than in Tokens (47.4% vs. 32.8%, Figure 1). This
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suggests that the different experience of exploitation weakened the desire to
expand the scale of interaction in Control.
Large groups never attained full cooperation, while several partnerships
attained it (37.0% in Tokens and 47.4% in Control, Figure 1). Those who
were in a cooperative partnership were less willing to widen the scale of interaction than those in other partnerships (the regressor “Full cooperation”
in Table 7 is negative and highly significant). Partners attained full cooperation more frequently in Control than in Tokens (the difference, however,
is not significant according to a two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test, and
marginally significant according to the regression in Table B3 in the online
Appendix), which suggests that the possibility of relying on monetary trade
displaced norms of voluntary help (Camera et al., 2013a).10 This is a second
reason behind the weaker desire to expand the scale of interaction observed in
Control compared to Tokens.
The “Tokens condition” dummies in Table 7 capture the residual difference
across conditions in participants’ willingness to widen the scale of interaction.
The estimated coefficient is positive and significant only for cycle 6, when
groups of 24 could be formed, but not for cycle 5, where the size of large
groups was 12, as in the Training Phase. A reason may be that participants
never experienced interaction in groups of 24 before. In this case the presence
of tokens made a difference, because participants realized that monetary trade
reduced strategic uncertainty. That is why participants in Tokens condition
10

In Tokens there is more than one way to support full cooperation—monetary exchange
or the trigger strategy—which may give rise to coordination issues. Among partners, a
single round of miscoordination would prevent monetary exchange, if it leaves the consumer without tokens. This can explain why full cooperation in Control was initially
more frequent than in Tokens. Subjects did converge on a norm of monetary exchange
in Tokens, but only with experience: in cycle 4 the frequency of full cooperation in
partnerships was similar in Control and Tokens, 62.5% v.s. 60.4%.
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were more willing to select large groups.

5.3

Efficiency

Recall that, by design, cooperative large groups create 50% more surplus than
cooperative partnerships, thus raising efficiency from 67% to 100%. But uncooperative large groups may also destroy surplus relative to partnerships.
Maximum efficiency could be attained in any condition by simply taking turns
at helping others—it did not require the exchange of tokens. By contrast,
experimental data reveal different patterns across conditions.
Result 3. Without tokens, endogenously-formed groups achieved lower efficiency than partnerships. The converse held true with tokens.
In the experiment, wide disparities emerged between Tokens and Control in the Selection Phase—when the group size was endogenous. In Control, efficiency fell when participants chose to widen the scale of interaction.
In Tokens, the opposite held true.
Table 8: How monetary trade and group size influence efficiency.
Dependent variable: efficiency
Control condition × Large
Tokens condition × Partnership
Tokens condition × Large
Cycle 6 (dummy)
Constant
N
R-squared

coefficient
-0.121**
-0.021
0.101
0.014
0.566***
32
0.343

S.E
(0.056)
(0.030)
(0.064)
(0.021)
(0.024)

Notes: One observation is the average efficiency in a cycle of a session, Selection
Phase only (cycles 5 and 6). The default condition is Control, partnerships.
Linear regression on realized efficiency on a set of dummy variables that include
the interaction between condition and group size. Standard errors are robust for
clustering at the session level. Data from rounds 1-16. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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The linear regression in Table 8 measures how efficiency varies with group
size and availability of tokens. The dependent variable is realized efficiency in
a cycle, in a session. In Tokens large groups attained significantly greater
efficiency than partnerships (67.2% vs. 55.4%, two-sided Wald test on the estimated coefficients, p-value=0.059). The opposite is true in Control (45.0%
vs. 57.3%, p-value=0.049). Large groups also attained greater efficiency in
Tokens than Control (two-sided Wald test on the estimated coefficients,
p-value=0.016). In partnerships, instead, efficiency levels were similar across
conditions.
Result 4. Strong monetary systems raised efficiency in large groups compared
to partnerships. Weak monetary systems reduced it.
As efficiency is proportional to cooperation rates, it is interesting to see how
cooperation rates differed across conditions, in the Selection Phase. When we
pool together data for cycles 5 and 6, we find that average cooperation rates in
large groups were 67.6% in Tokens vs. 47.2% in Control. As a comparison,
cooperation rates in partnerships were quite similar, with 83.1% in Tokens
vs. 86.0% in Control.
To assess the significance of these differences consider the regression in Table 9, based on the specification in Table 8. Partnership’s cooperation rates
are statistically similar across conditions. In each condition, cooperation rates
fall as we move from Partnerships to Large groups. However, the decline is
significantly larger in Control as compared to Tokens; the Control condition × Large and Tokens condition × Large coefficients are both negative, but
are significantly different at the 5 percent level (Wald test, p-value=0.019).
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Table 9: Cooperation in the Selection Phase.
Dep. var. =
Cooperation
Control condition × Large
Tokens condition × Partnership
Tokens condition × Large
Cycle 6
Constant
N
R-squared

coefficient
-0.404***
-0.033
-0.183**
0.032
0.842***
32
0.616

S.E
(0.063)
(0.045)
(0.068)
(0.022)
(0.034)

Notes: One observation is the average cooperation in each cycle of a session. Selection Phase only (cycles 5 and 6). The default condition is Control, partnerships.
Linear regression on average cooperation on a set of dummy variables that include
the interaction between condition and group size. Standard errors are robust for
clustering at the session level. Data from rounds 1-16. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗
indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

The distribution of efficiency across large groups gives us an additional
measure of how monetary trade affected economic performance. In the Tokens condition, 16 large groups were formed in the Selection Phase; half of
these groups exceeded the 67% efficiency threshold of partnerships (Figure 2).
Instead, in the Control condition this happened only in one of the five large
groups that were formed (a group of size N = 12).
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Training and Selection Phases.
Table 10: Intense monetary trade raises payoffs in large groups.
Dependent variable:
average per round profit
Intensity of monetary trade
at the group level
at the individual level
Cycle 6 (dummy)
Controls
Constant
N
R-squared (within)
R-squared (between)
R-squared (overall)

coefficient

S.E

3.419***
0.919***
-0.079**
Yes
3.819***
240
0.095
0.403
0.413

(0.203)
(0.215)
(0.033)
(0.499)

Notes: One observation per person per cycle. Selection Phase only (cycles 5 and 6).
Out of 16 possible opportunities to form large groups, 10 were realized (see Table
5 in Supplementary Material). Panel regression on data for large groups in the
Selection Phase, Tokens condition. The dependent variable is the average payoff
per-round for a participant in a large group. Among the regressors we include a
dummy taking value one for cycle 6. The regression includes controls for order
effects in the Training Phase, sex, the number of right answers and response time in
a comprehension test on the instructions. Standard errors are robust for clustering
at the session level. Data from rounds 1-16 only. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.

Linear regressions on average payoff per-round attained by participants
in large groups (Selection Phase) show a positive and significant effect of the
intensity of monetary trade at the group and at the individual level (Table 10).
The dependent variable is the average payoff per-round for a participant in a
large group (0, 1, or 2 observations per participant). The regressors include
two variables related to the intensity of monetary trade: at the group and
individual level.11
11

The intensity of monetary trade at the group level is measured as the overall frequency
of the actions “sell help” and “buy help”; at the individual level it is measured as the
frequency of the actions “sell help” and “buy help” in all rounds in which monetary trade
was feasible.
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6

Conclusions

We have shown that well-functioning monetary institutions can cause a group
of people to transition from engaging in low-value personal exchanges in partnerships, to pursue high-return impersonal exchange in large groups. We also
investigated, theoretically and empirically, the mechanism that enables this
transition.
In an experiment where participants could rely on the institution of money,
large groups spontaneously emerged, cooperated more, and created more surplus than partnerships. In contrast, large groups rarely emerged without a
monetary institution and, when they did, free-riding prevailed because defectors could not be identified. In each treatment, the decision to form large
groups involved every session participant, and it did not hinge on self-selection
effects because defectors could not be excluded from the group. This setup
differs from the typical experiments about endogenous group formation, where
inclusion or exclusion rules for single individuals make self-selection possible.
So, why did a monetary institution promote large-scale cooperation? Simply put, it offered protection from strategic uncertainty. Strategic uncertainty
becomes a central stumbling block to widening the scale of cooperation when
self-selection mechanisms are unavailable. Consider that our experimental
setup exhibits equilibrium multiplicity ranging from zero to full cooperation.
Partners can easily coordinate on a high-payoff strategy by relying on reciprocity and reputation. Instead, in large groups opportunistic temptations
are stronger because free-riders cannot be directly targeted for punishment.
This contributes to raising strategic uncertainty as participants are unsure
about what others will choose. Selecting a scale of interaction thus hinges on
the perceived trade-off between a partnership’s low but predictable payoff, and
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the possibly higher but unpredictable payoff of large groups.
Were cooperative types of participants more likely to choose large groups?
The answer is no: preferences for large groups were especially strong among
free riders, and were especially weak among cooperators who were their victims. This finding is perhaps surprising vis-a-vis the extant literature, where
the driving force behind endogenous group formation is self-selection. For example, if subjects can “vote with their feet,” then they can congregate into
homogenous cooperative groups. Under our design with random allocation of
participants to large groups, the mechanism at work is completely different. In
this manner we uniquely contribute to the literature about endogenous group
formation by studying an empirically-relevant mechanism for collective choice
that is not based on segregation.
These considerations explain why a monetary trade convention was so effective in supporting the transition to large-scale interaction. Money prevents
free-riders from exploiting cooperators: producers help only in exchange for
a token, and only consumers who helped in the past have a token. Hence,
money makes cooperators less reluctant to venture into groups of strangers.
The experimental data offer strong evidence about this mechanism. A unique
result is that only those experimental societies that were able to establish a
strong convention of monetary trade managed to transition to a large and successful group. In fact, we find that poorly functioning monetary institutions
proved to be a liability to large groups, lowering payoffs below those achieved
in partnerships, and even if partnerships were designed to be less efficient.
These findings provide novel insights into the role played by monetary systems within the architecture of modern economic systems. They also bring
forth new questions. For example, would subjects in an experiment collectively
decide to adopt a monetary system, if given the choice? We also need to better
37

understand how monetary systems would interact with self-selection mechanisms: would we observe the emergence of separate groups, some using money
and others relying on non-monetary institutions? We leave these questions to
future research.
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A

Appendix

A.1

Proof of Proposition 1

Define a generic meeting in round t by {i, oi (t)}, where i is a player and oi (t) is
the other player in the pair. To support full cooperation as a sequential Nash
equilibrium outcome we consider a trigger strategy described by an automaton
with two states, I and II.
Definition 1 (Cooperative strategy). At the start of any round t, player
i can be in state I or II, and takes actions only as a producer. As a producer,
player i selects “give help” in state I, and “no help” in state II. In t = 1, the
state is I; in all t ≥ 1
(i)

if player i is in state I, then i moves to state II in t + 1 only if some
producer in the group—not necessarily the producer in {i, oi (t)}—chooses
“no help.” Otherwise, player i remains in state I;

(ii)

there is no exit from state II.

Let the payoff matrix in the stage game be defined below.
Producer

Consumer

No help

Give help

d − l, d

k, 0

In the experiment d = 6, l = 3 and k = 15 in partnerships and 18 in large
d
groups. In order to prove Proposition 1, we show that, if β ≥ β ∗ =
,
k−d+l
then the strategy in Definition 1 supports full cooperation in equilibrium.
The proof is constructed by means of two lemmas. We start by calculating
equilibrium payoffs. Recall that players deterministically alternate between
the two roles of producer and consumer. Hence, in equilibrium players earn k
every other round. Discounting starts on date T , when the random termination
rule starts; hence, only payoffs from rounds t = T +1 (included) are discounted
at rate β. Let vs (t) denote the equilibrium payoff at the start of t = 1, 2, . . .
to a player who is in role s = 0, 1, where 0 =producer and 1 =consumer.
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Lemma 1. Fix T ≥ 1 and β ∈ (0, 1). In the cooperative equilibrium we have
v1 (t) > v0 (t) for all t = 1, 2, . . ., where for h = 1, 2 . . .,







vs (t) := 





T −t
+ vs ,
2
T −t+1
k×
+ βvs ,
2
vs ,

k×

and
vs :=

β 1−s
×k
1 − β2

if T − t = 2h
if T − t = 2h − 1,

(1)

if T − t ≤ 0,

for s = 0, 1.

Proof of Lemma 1. To prove the result we consider the two cases t ≥ T and
t < T separately.
Let vs denote the equilibrium payoff at the start of round t ≥ T to a player
who is in role s = 0, 1 (0 identifies a producer). It holds that
β 1−s
×k
vs :=
1 − β2

for s = 0, 1.

The payoff is time invariant due to the stationary alternation between roles.
Now consider round t < T . Given the proposed strategy those who are
initial consumers earn k on odd dates (t = 1, 3, . . .) and zero otherwise; initial
producers earn k on even dates (t = 2, 4, . . .) and zero otherwise. Hence,
knowing if T − t is odd or even matters. For j, h = 1, 2 . . . and s = 0, 1 it holds
that

T −t


 k×
+ vs
if T − t = 2h
2
vs (t) =
T −t+1


 k×
+ βvs if T − t = 2h − 1.
2
The continuation payoff vs (t) has two components. The first sums up the
round payoffs for all t ≤ T − 1. The second sums up the round payoffs for
all t ≥ T . It should be clear that vs (t) is increasing in T for s = 0, 1 and it
achieves a minimum when T − t = 1. Hence, the equilibrium payoff to a player
in role s = 0, 1 on any date t ≥ 1 is given by (1). We have v1 (t) > v0 (t) for all
t because v1 > v0 for all β ∈ (0, 1).
The equilibrium payoff is found by substituting t = 1 in expression (1).
To determine the optimality of the cooperative strategy we must check two
items: (i) in equilibrium no producer has an incentive to defect; (ii) out of
equilibrium no producer has an incentive to cooperate. We let v̂s (t) denote
the continuation payoff to a player in role s on date t, off equilibrium.
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Consider a generic producer in a round t ≥ 1. In equilibrium, choosing
“give help” is a best response if
v0 (t) ≥ v̂0 (t).

(2)

The left-hand-side of the inequality denotes the payoff to a producer who
cooperates in the round, choosing “give help.” The right-hand-side denotes the
continuation payoff on date t if the producer defects in equilibrium (reverting
back to playing the social norm in the next round), given that off-equilibrium
everyone follows the group punishment rule prescribed by the social norm.
Hence, if a defection occurs on t, then every producer selects “no help” from
t + 1 because equilibrium defections are public.
It should be clear that
v̂0 (t) = v̂0 :=

d + β(d − l)
1 − β2

if t ≥ T.

For h = 1, 2, . . ., the continuation payoff off-equilibrium satisfies

v̂0 (t) :=













T −t
+ v̂0
2
T −t+1
(d + d − l) ×
+ βv̂0
2
v̂0
(d + d − l) ×

if T − t = 2h
if T − t = 2h − 1,

(3)

if T − t ≤ 0.

Off equilibrium payoffs are independent of the size of the group N since producers defect forever after seeing a defection.
Lemma 2. Fix T ≥ 1 and β ∈ (0, 1). If β ≥ β ∗ :=
v̂0 (t) for all t ≥ 1.

d
, then v0 (t) ≥
k−d+l

Proof of Lemma 2. The result is obtained by manipulation of the equations
in (3). Note that
v0 − v̂0 =

β
d + β(d − l)
β
d
×k−
=
× (k − 2d + l) −
2
2
2
1−β
1−β
1−β
1+β
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Now define
∆0 (t) = v0 (t) − v̂0 (t)
=













T −t
+ v0 − v̂0
2
T −t+1
(k − 2d + l) ×
+ β(v0 − v̂0 )
2
v0 − v̂0
(k − 2d + l) ×

if T − t = 2h
if T − t = 2h − 1,
if T − t ≤ 0.

It is immediate that ∆0 (t = T − 2h) > ∆0 (t ≥ T ); note that k − 2d + l > 0
by assumption. Also, ∆0 (t = T − 2h + 1) > ∆0 (t ≥ T ); to prove it insert
h = 1 (the most stringent case), rearrange the inequality, and then insert the
expression for v0 − v̂0 , to obtain the inequality k − 2d + l > −d.
Given that the minimum value of ∆0 (t) is achieved for T − t ≤ 0, then (2)
holds for all t whenever
d
β
× (k − 2d + l) −
2
1−β
1+β
d
.
⇔ β ≥ β ∗ :=
k−d+l

0 ≤ v0 − v̂0 =

Note that β ∗ < 1 because k − 2d + l > 0 by assumption.
Given that everyone else adopts the strategy in Definition 1, it is always
individually optimal to punish out of equilibrium, because “no help” is the
dominant action when everyone forever defects.
Note that v̂s (1) is the payoff associated to infinite repetition of the static
Nash equilibrium (every producer chooses “no help”), which is always an equilibrium of the repeated game. The condition β ≥ β ∗ is therefore necessary
and sufficient for existence of a cooperative equilibrium because it ensures
that players earn payoffs above those guaranteed by defecting in any round.

A.2

Proof of Proposition 2

Conjecture that monetary trade is an equilibrium. Consider a player with
s = 0, 1 tokens at the start of a round. In equilibrium, a consumer has a
token and a producer has none. Hence, the probability that a consumer with
a token meets a producer without tokens is 1. Denote by vs (t) the equilibrium
continuation payoff. Because the consumption pattern is the same as under
the social norm, in monetary equilibrium it holds that vs (t) corresponds to the
functions defined in (1).
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Now consider deviations. We start by proving that a consumer does not
deviate in equilibrium, refusing quid-pro-quo exchange for help. Recall that,
according to the monetary trading strategy, equilibrium deviations do not trigger a switch in behavior. However, they alter the tokens’ distribution, possibly
only temporarily. To find a sufficient condition for the existence of a monetary
equilibrium, we consider the best-case scenario where the distribution of tokens goes back to equilibrium in the second round of play after the defection.
This will happen if, in the round after the deviation, the deviator meets the
same counterpart again. Here, the incentive to deviate is the largest for a producer because the system is back in equilibrium two rounds after a unilateral
deviation occurs.
In round t ≥ 1 let βt = 1 if t < T and βt = β otherwise. Denote by
ṽ1 (t) the payoff in t to a consumer who moves off equilibrium and defects, by
refusing to spend money in t. Using recursive arguments we have
ṽ1 (t) = d − l + βt [d + βt+1 v1 (t + 2)]
< k + βt [0 + βt+1 v1 (t + 2)] = v1 (t).
The inequality holds for any βt because k > d + d − l by assumption. To
understand the inequality consider the first line. Defecting in t generates
payoff d − l instead of k, and in t + 1 the player will be a producer with money,
reverting back to playing the monetary strategy (unimprovability criterion).
Hence, she will refuse to sell for another token because she already has one;
this is optimal because (i) acquiring an additional token costs her d and (ii)
she has already one token to spend. Hence, in t + 2 the player becomes a
consumer with money and the distribution of tokens is back at equilibrium.
In summary, after a unilateral deviation in t by a consumer, in the best-case
scenario the group is back on the equilibrium path in round t + 2.
Now we prove that if β ≥ β ∗ , then a producer in equilibrium would not
want to deviate in any t, refusing to help for a token. Denote by ṽ0 (t) the
payoff in t to a producer who defects by refusing to accept money in t. Using
recursive arguments, we have
ṽ0 (t) = d + βt [d − l + βt+1 v0 (t + 2)]
< 0 + βt [k + βt+1 v0 (t + 2)] = v0 (t).
The inequality holds for any βt ≥ β ∗ because k > d+d−l (if βt = 1); if βt = β,
then we need β ≥ β ∗ . The first line of the inequality shows that defecting in
t generates payoff d instead of 0. In t + 1 the player is a consumer without
money; she cannot buy help—since everyone adopts the monetary strategy—
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and earns d − l. In t + 2 she is a producer without money and the distribution
of tokens is back at equilibrium. Hence, after a unilateral deviation in t by a
producer, the group is back in equilibrium in round t + 2.

A.3

Proof of Proposition 3

The payoff matrix in a round is
Outcome:
Consumer’s payoff:
Producer’s payoff:

C
0
g

D
d
d−l

with d = 6, l = 3, g = 15 in fixed pairs and 18 in large groups. The possible
group size is 2n, with n = 1, 6, 12.
Following the risk dominance concept in Blonski et al. (2011)—an indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma game in fixed pairs—consider uncertainty
over two competing strategies: “grim” and “always defect” in Control;
“monetary trade” and “always defect” in Tokens.
A.3.1

Control condition: the grim strategy is not risk dominant

Consider uncertainty over two competing strategies: “grim” (G ) and “always
defect” (AD). Initial producers select a strategy in round 1 and maintain it
for the rest of the supergame. Initial consumers take no action in round 1,
so we set them free to select G or AD in round 2. Given public monitoring,
all uncertainty about future play is resolved at the end of round 1. If no-one
(someone) defected then every producer cooperates (defects) in every future
round. Hence, the choice of strategy G dominates AD in round 2 (weakly, if
someone defects in round 1). The full cooperation payoff to a consumer, v, is
larger than the full defection payoff, v̂, since
v̂ :=

d − l + βd
1 − β2

and

v :=

g
,
1 − β2

with v̂ < v since by assumption 2d − l < g. Therefore, we say that a strategy
is risk dominant if it makes an initial producer at least indifferent to choosing
the competing strategy.
Large groups: there is strategic uncertainty in the first round because an
initial producer is not sure what strategy the other n − 1 initial producers will
select. Suppose that every initial producer believes that in round 1 there is
probability p that C is the outcome in any given pair; D is the outcome with
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the complementary probability. The probability p is easily mapped into beliefs
about strategy selection: the player believes that every other initial producers
plays G with probability p, and AD otherwise.
Given public monitoring, all uncertainty about future outcomes is resolved
by the end of the round 1: either C will be the outcome in every meeting, or
D will be the outcome in every meeting. The central question is how likely
it is that full cooperation will emerge. Since the probability p of outcome
C is independent across meetings, the initial strategic uncertainty increases
with the group size 2n. Fix an initial producer, and suppose he selects G.
The probability that there is full cooperation in round 1 is pn−1 , i.e., the
joint probability that C is selected by all other n − 1 producers. Here, full
cooperation occurs forever after. With complementary probability 1 − pn−1
there is some defection in round 1, and full defection forever after.
Denote VG and VAD the expected payoffs for an initial producer who chooses
strategy G and AD where
VAD = d + βv̂,
VG = 0 + pn−1 βv + (1 − pn−1 )βv̂.
Consider VAD : the initial producer defects so all future producers will defect (if
they chose G or AD). Therefore, in round 2 the initial producer is a consumer
with payoff βv̂. Consider VG : the initial producer cooperates but the continuation payoff depends on the outcome in all other round 1 meetings. With
probability pn−1 every other producer is also a grim player so the continuation
payoff is βv; otherwise, if some initial producer defects, the full defection continuation payoff is βv̂. The key observation is that all strategic uncertainty is
resolved by the end of round 1. We say that G is risk dominant if
VG ≥ VAD ⇒ pn−1 β(v − v̂) − d ≥ 0,
⇒ β 2 d(1 − pn−1 ) + βpn−1 (g + l − d) − d ≥ 0,
⇒ β ≥ β ∗∗ (n)
with
∗∗

β (n) :=

pn−1 (d − g − l) +

q

p2(n−1) (g + l − d)2 + 4d2 (1 − pn−1 )
∈ (0, 1).
2d(1 − pn−1 )

A special case is p = 0.5, which may be motivated by the “principle of insufficient reason” for someone who is unsure about which of the two strategies other
initial producers will choose. If so, then β ∗∗ (6) = 0.976 and β ∗∗ (12) = 0.99.
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Since in the experiment β ∗∗ > β = 0.75 strategy AD is risk dominant. In Control strategic uncertainty prevents large groups from attaining the efficient
outcome.
Fixed pairs: The analysis for the case of fixed pairs is an adaptation of the
analysis above. The important difference is the absence of strategic uncertainty since there is just one player who takes an action in each round (the
subject who is a producer in that round). In a sense, here the player who is a
producer in round 1 gets to select the equilibrium and can therefore select the
efficient equilibrium by cooperating in round 1. The reason is as follows: if the
initial producer cooperates in round 1, then this reveals that she has selected
strategy G. Therefore, the initial consumer faces no strategic uncertainty. In
fact, choosing strategy G is always a best response for the player who is a
producer in round 2 (even if the initial producer defects, as we noted above).
Hence, adopting strategy G is optimal for the initial producer because there is
no uncertainty over the strategy selected by the counterpart. This is the central difference between our helping game and the PD game in fixed pairs—it
simplifies coordination on the efficient outcome in fixed pairs. Technically if
d
= 0.5
n = 1, then pn−1 = 1 and hence VG ≥ VAD implies β ≥ β ∗ =
g+l−d
since g = 15 in fixed pairs.
A.3.2

Tokens condition: monetary trade is risk dominant

When tokens are available we let “Monetary Trade” (M T ) compete against
AD. The main difference relative to Control is that initial consumers must
also select a strategy, since they have one token each and so their action set
is non-empty. Note that M T is a history-independent strategy, unlike grim.
The main implication is that histories of play in this scenario cannot affect
future play and that the inefficient full defection outcome can arise only if all
initial producers select AD.
It should be clear that since tokens are intrinsically worthless, M T is risk
dominant for initial consumers, no matter the uncertainty over strategy selection by others. Offering a token quid-pro-quo for help can only increase
an initial consumer’s payoff from d − l to g, without lowering her continuation payoff even if everyone else selects AD. It follows that initial strategic
uncertainty matters only for initial producers, who give up d to receive an
intrinsically worthless token from a consumer. We therefore say that M T is
risk dominant if it leaves the representative initial producer at least indifferent
to choosing the competing AD strategy.
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Fixed pairs: the immediate implication is that strategic uncertainty is not
an issue in fixed pairs. The initial producer can select the efficient equilibrium
by choosing the M T strategy, knowing that M T is risk dominant for the
initial consumer. Indeed, if both choose M T , then the efficient equilibrium
βg
. Instead, if either
is attained. Here the initial producer earns payoff
1 − β2
player chooses AD, then the inefficient equilibrium is attained. Here, the
d + β(d − l)
initial producer earns payoff
, which is lower than the efficient
1 − β2
d
= 0.5. Since β = 0.75 in the
equilibrium payoff if β ≥ β ∗ =
g+l−d
experiment, strategic uncertainty is not an issue in fixed pairs and monetary
trade has no advantage over grim.
Large groups: to maintain comparability with the analysis in the Control
condition, let us consider uncertainty over outcomes in a meeting. The main
difference is that the outcome in a meeting now involves not only C or D but
also whether a token is transferred from consumer to producer or not, i.e.,
whether there is “trade” or no “trade.” Let an initial producer believe that
trade occurs with probability p in any given pair of round 1. In round 1,
this probability p easily maps into beliefs about strategy selection. We have
already established that M T is risk dominant for initial consumers. Hence, to
simplify matters let us suppose that initial consumers assign probability one
to M T being selected by those who are consumers in round 1. This implies
that if an initial producer selects M T with probability p, then trade occurs
with probability p in her round 1 match.
Hence, if we consider the initial round of play we have the following.
• Initial consumer (who has one token): if she chooses AD, then her payoff
d − l + βd
. As noted above, choosing M T is optimal because this gives
is
1 − β2
her at least a chance to earn g > d − l in round 1 and do no worse in
future rounds than by choosing AD.
• Initial producer (who has no token): if she chooses AD, then she will
never trade so we have the same expression as before, i.e.,
VAD =

d + β(d − l)
.
1 − β2

Instead, if she selects M T she expects to trade with certainty in round
1, since all initial consumers select M T (given the considerations above).
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The continuation payoff, however, depends on what strategy was selected
by all other initial producers. The payoff at the start of the game can
be written as
VM T = 0 + pn−1

βg
+ (1 − pn−1 )βV1 ,
1 − β2

where V1 denotes the expected payoff if not everyone trades in round 1,
which we now calculate.
The problem in calculating V1 is that, unlike Control, strategic uncertainty in Tokens gets resolved in round 1 only if trade occurs in every
meeting—an outcome that can be publicly observed. In that case, the continβg
. However,
uation payoff for an initial producer (who also chose M T ) is
1 − β2
strategic uncertainty remains if not everyone trades in round 1, because the
distribution of outcomes is not made public. Hence, if full cooperation is not
realized in round 1, then we must account for uncertainty over outcomes in
all future rounds. The probability of trading in such future meetings depends
on the distribution of tokens, which evolves at random and is unobserved by
players. To see this, note that if someone does not adopt M T , then tokens will
not be exchanged in some pairs so as play progresses some producers will have
a token, while some consumers will not. Hence, monetary trade may fail to
occur even in meetings between players who have each selected M T . Assessing this trading uncertainty is problematic because the distribution of tokens
evolves based on random meetings. For an initial p, we can find a long-run
probability trading in a meeting using a technique similar to the one adopted
to calculate payoffs off monetary equilibrium in Bigoni et al. (2015). As these
calculations are lengthy and elaborated for participants, we adopt a more reasonable, heuristic approach. We simply suppose that if monetary trade does
not occur in all initial meetings, then an initial producer will naively assign
the same probability p of trading in any future meeting in which she is either
a producer without tokens, or a consumer with a token.
Given this heuristic approach, consider a player who initially selected strategy M T , when strategic uncertainty was not resolved in round 1. Let V0 and
V1 denote the expected utilities at the start of any round after the first, if
the player is, respectively, a producer without a token and a consumer with a
token. We have
V0 = p(0 + βV1 ) + (1 − p)[d + β(d − l + βV0 )],
V1 = p(g + βV0 ) + (1 − p)[d − l + β(d + βV1 )].
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The player expects not to trade with probability 1 − p. As this implies no
change in her token inventory, the player cannot trade in the next round,
either. If she is a producer who does not sell, then she will have no token to
spend next round, as a consumer. If she is a consumer who does not buy, then
she keeps the token and will not need to sell next round. Hence, it takes two
rounds to have a new chance to trade.
Rewrite
V0 [1 − (1 − p)β 2 ] = pβV1 + (1 − p)[d + β(d − l)],
V1 [1 − (1 − p)β 2 ] = pg + pβV0 + (1 − p)(d − l + βd).
Substituting we have
#

"

V1

(pβ)2
= pg
1 − (1 − p)β −
1 − (1 − p)β 2
βp(1 − p)[d + β(d − l)]
+ (1 − p)(d − l + βd).
+
1 − (1 − p)β 2
2

The monetary trade strategy is risk dominant for initial producers if VM T ≥
VAD . Given p = 0.5, we have VM T ≥ VAD for all β ≥ 0.63 approximately if
n = 6, and β ≥ 0.64 approximately if n = 12 . Hence a (long-run) 5050 chance to trade in a round still supports the efficient equilibrium in the
Tokens conditions, because it makes monetary trade risk-dominant.
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